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ABSTRACT
Social network platforms have transformed how people com-
municate and share information. However, as these plat-
forms have evolved, the ability for users to control how and
with whom information is being shared introduces challenges
concerning the configuration and comprehension of privacy
settings. To address these concerns, our crowd sourced ap-
proach simplifies the understanding of privacy settings by
using data collected from 512 users over a 17 month pe-
riod to generate visualizations that allow users to compare
their personal settings to an arbitrary subset of individuals
of their choosing. To validate our approach we conducted an
online survey with closed and open questions and collected
59 valid responses after which we conducted follow-up inter-
views with 10 respondents. Our results showed that 70% of
respondents found visualizations using crowd sourced data
useful for understanding privacy settings, and 80% preferred
a crowd sourced tool for configuring their privacy settings
over current privacy controls.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.4.1 [Public Policy Issues]: Privacy; H.5.2 [User Inter-
faces]: User-centered design; H.3.3 [Information Search




privacy, empirical studies, crowdsourcing, data visualiza-
tion, social networking, user study
1. INTRODUCTION
As social network platforms, such as Facebook, have in-
creased the amount of personal data they contain, the ease
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with which individual users can understand and control their
own data is a growing concern [21]. Current privacy set-
tings are often complicated and difficult to navigate [8]. For
example, Facebook obfuscates privacy settings by splitting
privacy controls across several seemingly unrelated portions
of the application. The problem is made worse by occa-
sional unannounced changes that are instituted without giv-
ing users the option to opt-out before the change takes effect
[6].
Previous research efforts have focused on how well users
understand their privacy. Some of this research has shown a
disparity between what users intend when configuring their
privacy settings and the reality of what their settings rep-
resent [12, 13]. Other research has introduced techniques
aimed at making privacy more understandable and easier
to control. There have been several approaches, includ-
ing introducing separate third-party software to store and
manage a social network user’s content independently of the
social network service [19], providing access controls that
enable social network users to segregate risky connections
[4], and creating automated tools for classifying every con-
nection into labeled groups and then applying label-based
privileges to these groups [5]. However, none of these tech-
niques allowed users to see and understand their privacy
settings alongside the privacy settings from other individ-
uals or peer groups. Because social networks are designed
for sharing, a contextualized view of privacy (seeing one’s
privacy settings alongside the settings of others) is easier to
understand than an isolated view. This is our approach. We
use crowd sourced data to give users more information with
which to make decisions on how they would like to set their
privacy.
This paper aims to introduce a crowd sourced technique
for improving social network users’ understanding of privacy.
To this end we conducted a study which included an online
survey for which we received 59 valid responses. As part of
the survey, we presented users with three alternative privacy
control options: 1. a 3-option model (easy/medium/hard),
2. a survey based model, and 3. a crowd sourced model.
After the survey, we performed follow-up interviews with
10 respondents in order to confirm survey responses with
additional qualitative feedback, and to determine if user un-
derstanding of privacy could be improved with data visual-
izations. The visualizations used were produced with data
collected from 512 Facebook users over a 17 month period.
The results of the survey show that users tended to prefer
the 3-option and survey-based models. During the follow-
up interviews users were presented with mock-ups of the
three models and asked to rate them. The results show that
users preferred all of the alternative models over the cur-
rent controls, and in particular, the survey based and crowd
sourced models were the most popular options. We believe
the change-of-preference reflects the lack of user familiarity
with crowd sourced models. Additionally, we found that
70% of users found data visualizations useful when config-
uring privacy settings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 describes our approach, section 3 describes the design
of our study. Section 4-6 highlight the key results. Section 7
covers the implications of the results and limitations of the
study. Related work is covered in section 8 and we conclude
the paper in section 9.
2. APPROACH
The motivation for this study was to improve user under-
standing of privacy by addressing issues that currently exist
with social network’s privacy controls: persistence (how long
a user-defined setting remains constant), validation (how
easily a user is able to confirm their settings), and com-
parison (the ability for users to see their privacy settings
alongside the settings of other users and groups). In this
section, we outline the motivating research questions and
the approach we selected to address these questions.
2.1 Research Questions
The goal of this study is to examine methods for improv-
ing user understanding of privacy settings. In particular, we
want to determine if crowd sourced data can be used to sim-
plify comprehension of privacy settings. The Oxford English
Dictionary defines privacy as the “Absence or avoidance of
publicity or display; secrecy, concealment, discretion; pro-
tection from public knowledge or availability [1].” We use
the term privacy specifically as it relates to data privacy
for information stored on social networks. We use the term
privacy settings as a reference to the end-user configurable
settings managing the accessibility of data stored on social
networks. By understand, we mean the knowledge a user
has about what information they are and are not sharing
on a social network. We are not interested in whether or
not users are aware of potential consequences that sharing
information may entail.
We focused on the following research questions:
• RQ 1: Do users understand their current privacy
settings? (Section 4)
• RQ 2: Can user understanding of privacy be improved
using crowd sourced data? (Section 5)
• RQ 3: Are there tools for configuring privacy that are
preferred over the currently provided tools? (Section
6)
2.2 Crowdsourcing Privacy
In order to improve user understanding of privacy through
a crowd sourced approach, we created a set of visualiza-
tions that summarize a user’s privacy settings and provide a
comparative view with the settings from other users. These
visualizations can be split into two different categories: Indi-
vidual Visualizations, containing only data for a single user,
and Contextualized Visualizations, showing a single users
data in the context of the data of multiple users. The fol-
lowing subsections describe the dataset that was used and
the visualizations that were created.
2.2.1 Dataset
Our dataset contains the information of 512 Facebook
users, collected since May 1st 2012. The data was collected
using an automated tool that retrieved users’ privacy infor-
mation from the Facebook Graph API. On average, there
were a total of 154 scans made per user. The number of
scans varied slightly due to API outages and incomplete or
badly formatted API responses. Each scan has data repre-
senting the amount of information in each category that a
user is sharing, such as number of mutual friends, number
of check-ins, number of photos, etc., for a total of 41 differ-
ent categories. By collecting data across all categories for
a single user, we have a measure of how much information
that particular user is sharing. Similarly, by combining the
data collected across users, we have a measure of how much
each category is being shared.
2.2.2 Individual Visualizations
The first visualization (Figure 1) in this group, is a line
graph displaying the data from each category for an indi-
vidual user across time. This view is valuable to a user
because it allows them to confirm their settings have not
changed unexpectedly (persistence), and get an overview of
their settings (validation). The y-axis of the visualization
represents the magnitude of the returned data. For exam-
ple, the number of friends a user has. The x-axis represents
time, with each increment marking a single scan of the user’s
data. Each line in the visualization represents a different cat-
egory. The categories are set apart with different colors and
distinct shapes for the anchors. When data was unavailable
for a category the value was mapped to 0. When the Face-
book Graph API returned an error, the value was mapped to
-10. This visualization is helpful for identifying changes over
time for the different categories, and provides users with a
history and current snapshot of what information is being
shared.
The second visualization (Figure 2) in this group is a word
cloud. The word cloud provides users with a quick and easily
understood view of what categories they are sharing (valida-
tion and persistence). The size of the font for each category
represents the the magnitude of the shared content (how
many friends a user has). Categories for which a user shares
no data have the smallest font. If an API error was re-
turned the text for that category is striked out. An example
of this is shown with the“inbox” in Figure 2. While the word
cloud visualization provides users with an easily understood
display of their individual privacy settings, it could also be
used to display the data of a group of users. In this case, the
size of the font would represent the number of users shar-
ing a category, and the strike out would indicate that no
users share the category. This would allow users to quickly
understand how common it is for an category to be shared
(comparison).
2.2.3 Contextualized Visualizations
The first visualization (Figure 3) in this group is a series of
donut charts. This visualization shows an individual users
content in the context of a larger group of users, thereby
allowing them to easily see how their settings compare to
the settings of the members of the larger group. Each donut
represents all of the data collected from the 512 Facebook
users for single category. The blue portion of the donut rep-
resents the percentage of users that share data for the cate-
gory, the orange represents the percentage that do not have
data for the category, and the gray represents the percentage
for which the Facebook Graph API returned an error. API
errors typically indicated the category had been restricted as
policy or for which the user had restricted sharing. For the
individual using this visualization, we indicated whether or
not they shared category by fading out the category if it was
not shared, and additionally adding a color-coded dot at the
top left of the donut. This visualization is useful when deter-
mining what are the trending privacy settings for a specific
group (in this case, the entire set of data that was collected
from the 512 over the 17 period).
The second visualization (Figure 4) in this group dis-
plays data about how the settings for a single category have
changed over time, for multiple users, and highlights the in-
dividual user within this data. The y-axis represents the
magnitude of the data being shared (e.g., the number of
friends), and the x-axis represents the scan number (e.g., 50
represents the 50th scan). Each line represents a single users
data. The highlighted line represents the individuals users
data among the larger group. Again, for cases where there
was no data returned the value was mapped to 0, and for
cases where an API error occurred the value was mapped
to -10. This visualization provides the individual with a
good measure of how much information they are sharing
compared to the larger group (comparison). Additionally,
this visualization is useful for detecting changes in privacy,
or, in a broader context, “global” changes (persistence and
validation). As can be seen in Figure 4, if the visualization
shows abrupt changes to many users data simultaneously,
it may indicate a policy change, widespread error, or other
noteworthy event.
2.3 Alternative Tools
In order to determine if there are tools that are preferred
over the currently available privacy configuration tools, we
selected a list of three alternatives. These tools attempt
to simplify user configuration of privacy by minimizing the
amount of user input required to achieve the desired settings.
The first mechanism is a 3-option (easy/medium/hard)
system, where users can preset a system wide default level of
privacy from a list with only three options. The user could,
for example, set the default level of privacy to “completely
private,”“friends only,” or “completely public”. This mech-
anism enables users to quickly define a privacy level. The
second system consists of a short survey where users are in-
directly asked about their personal preferences, and the tool
would later determine which are the best privacy settings for
that user based on the responses. The third mechanism is a
crowd sourced tool, where users can set their privacy level
based off a particular individual or a group of their choosing.
For the three tools, in order to fully satisfy a user’s pref-
erences, the settings determined would serve as a baseline
and users were given the option to later tweak the settings
using the currently available mechanisms.
3. STUDY DESIGN
In this section we will describe the methods used to vali-
date our approach.
3.1 Research Methods
Our study is designed to both qualitatively and quanti-
tatively explore user understanding of privacy settings and
preferences for privacy tools. As a quantitative approach,
we created an online survey that consisted of 26 questions.
Out of these, 16 were closed questions and respondents had
to choose and answer from a given list of options. These
questions consisted of 3-point and 5-point semantic scale
questions as well as multiple choice questions. We chose to
use semantic scale questions because they allow for quanti-
tative measurement of subjective ratings while also allowing
for some flexibility in interpretation [16]. For example, one
of the questions was: “Would you agree or disagree that you
are concerned about online privacy?” and the answer op-
tions were: “strongly agree,”“moderately agree,”“neutral,”
“moderately disagree,” and “strongly disagree.” We used the
3-point scale for the majority of the semantic scale questions,
as we did not need respondents to have the more granular
choices as provided by the 5-point scale. It has been shown
that 3-point scales do not significantly reduce reliability or
validity [10]. Some of the multiple choice questions allowed
respondents to enter a personalized response into a field la-
beled other. For example, one of the questions was: “If you
would be willing to give up certain services or features in
exchange for privacy, what services or features would you
be willing to discontinue?” and the answer options were:
“Photo Sharing”,’ “Seeing friends of friends,”“Geotagging,”
“Search availability (other people can find you on the social
network ),”“Messaging,”“Lists or Groups,” and “Other.” In
total, the survey took 5-10 minutes to answer.
In addition to the survey, we also performed follow-up
interviews with 10 survey respondents to gather additional
quantitative as well as qualitative data. The follow-up in-
terview consisted of 12 questions. For these questions, we
used 3-point and 5-point semantic scales as well as yes-no
questions in cases where binary responses were all that was
needed. For all of these questions, we used the“’think aloud”
technique, where the interviewee was told to speak freely in
their response to allow us to gather deeper insights about
user perspectives on privacy. Data visualizations were used
to help describe the proposed privacy tools to the intervie-
wees. The follow-up interviews were performed in person
or over Skype and took from 25-45 minutes to complete de-
pending on the extent to which the interviewee expanded on
the interview question responses.
To increase reliability of the study [16], we took the fol-
lowing measures:
• Random order of answers: The answer options for the
closed questions were randomly ordered. This ensures
that the answer order does not influence the response.
• Validation questions: To ensure that respondents did
not fill out the answers arbitrarily, we included two
validation questions [3]. For example, one of the val-
idation questions was: “What is the result of 5+2?”
Respondents who did not answer these questions cor-
rectly were not included in the final set of valid re-
sponses.
3.2 Survey Respondents
We did not have any restrictions on who could fill out the
survey. Because we wanted a diverse set of respondents, we
distributed our survey through a variety of channels includ-
Figure 1: Individual visualization: Visualization of a single user’s data from all categories presented over
time.
Figure 2: Individual visualization: Visualization of a single user’s data from all categories as a snapshot in
time
Figure 3: Contextualized visualization: A single user’s data from as a snapshot in time (small dot top left
corner) presented in the context of the same data collected from 512 users over 17 months (the larger donut)
Figure 4: Contextualized visualization: a single user’s data, for a single category presented over time, in the
context of the same data collected from 512 users over a 17 month period
ing social networks like Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn,
various mailing lists, and to personal and professional col-
leagues. We also enlisted the help of colleagues to further
widen the distribution of the survey.
In total 63 respondents filled out our survey between 2 Au-
gust 2013 and 6 October 2013. Filtering out the incomplete
and invalid responses resulted in 59 valid responses (93.6%
completion rate). The survey along with the raw data and
summary information are available on our website.
3.3 Follow-up Interview Participants
After completing the survey, users were asked if they would
be willing to participate in a follow-up interview. Of the
59 valid survey respondents 19 agreed to participate. From
these 19, we selected 10 respondents based on schedule avail-
ability and geographic diversity. The only restriction for
someone being able to participate in the follow-up inter-
view, was that they had to be an active Facebook user. The
follow-up interview included a privacy analysis that would
scan the respondent’s profile, and use this data to generate a
visualization of their privacy setup. The visualizations that
were generated are mentioned in section 2.2.
4. AWARENESSANDUNDERSTANDINGOF
PRIVACY
As mentioned earlier, one of the main goals of this study is
to understand what is the current understanding of privacy
settings and attitudes towards privacy for a social network
user (RQ1). In this section, the findings of this study will
be discussed.
4.1 Privacy in Social Networks
From a total of 59 users, 85% agreed that they are con-
cerned about their privacy, while only 15% were neutral or
not concerned about this issue. During the follow-up in-
terview, it was shown that even though most of the privacy
settings on Facebook are customizable with only a few clicks,
most from the respondents feel that this platform is “con-
stantly changing the settings, making it hard to customize
privacy”. This result corroborates what others have studied
[7].
Most respondents have configured their privacy settings,
with 88% clearing their cookies, 85% clearing their web
browser cache, and 95% deleting their web browser history.
Additionally, 73% of respondents are concerned that some
social networks track their online activity through their web
browsing history. These numbers show that most users are
concerned about their online privacy on social networks, and
thus modify what information is made available to the social
network.
When users were asked to rate themselves on their un-
derstanding of how to customize their privacy settings using
a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is the least understanding and 5
is the most understanding, 80% of respondents rated them-
selves above a 3. Using the same scale, 50% of respondents
rated themselves above a 3 on their understanding of what
they are and are not sharing on social networks.
However, when users were asked to change the visibility
of a specific setting on Facebook (Contact Settings: Website
or Contact Settings: e-mail), only half of the respondents
were able to perform the task in under 3 minutes. If the
respondent could not perform the task in under 3 minutes,
the task was considered timed out, and there was a binary
classification of “task complete” and “task incomplete.” It is
interesting to note the disparity between the score respon-
dents gave themselves, as opposed to the actual knowledge
they had on how to configure their privacy settings.
4.2 Cost of Privacy
Users were asked to answer a few questions designed to
help researchers understand how much users value their on-
line privacy. These questions refer to different cost dimen-
sions such as monetary cost, green (ecological) cost, and
service cost.
Monetary cost refers to the money people are willing to
spend to protect their online privacy. Even though users
from different countries were asked to answer the survey,
US dollars were used as a standard metric for the survey
question. A total of 22% of the respondents said they would
be willing to spend money in order to have privacy in their
social networks, and 13% of all respondents said they would
be willing to spend $1 - $10 per year on privacy. For ex-
ample, sites like LinkedIn have a “premium fee” or extra
charge that provide users with additional privacy features
in exchange for a monetary cost. It is interesting to note
that although respondents are concerned about their online
privacy, few are willing to pay to protect it. These results
are consistent with has been researched by others [2].
Performing any operation on a computer requires energy.
According to Google, serving a single user for one month
emits about 8 grams of carbon per day, which is similar
to driving a car for a mile [9]. We wanted to determine
if users would be willing to incur in an environmental cost
associated with increased privacy. From the online survey
responses, 19% of the users would be willing to give up cer-
tain services in exchange for a reduced environmental cost.
The services they were more likely to give up were: friends
of friends visibility (15%), geotagging (12%), and individual
photo sharing (8%).
When users were asked if they would be willing to give
up certain services in exchange for increased privacy, 59%
said they would be willing to give up some services. Some of
the most common services that users were willing to give up
were: geotagging (49%), friends of friends visibility (42%),
and search availability (32%).
5. IMPROVING USER UNDERSTANDING
OF PRIVACY
In order to determine if user understanding of privacy can
be improved through a crowd sourced approach (RQ2), users
were asked to evaluate the visualizations from section 2. A
semantic scale of 1 to 5 was used, where 1 is the least useful
and 5 is the most useful. Additionally, users were asked if
they would use a tool that included these visualizations.
Using the semantic scale, 70% of users rated the crowd
sourced visualization tool above a 3. User appreciated the
fact that they could“easily see any changes in their settings”.
Users were additionally asked if they would use such a tool.
80% of the respondents said they would use it at least once,
arguing that the visualizations are a good way to verify if
what they configured actually represents what they meant.
When asked how often would they like to be notified about
their privacy settings, most respondents (90%) said they
would prefer to be notified any time there is a change in
their settings, 20% would like to have a monthly report, and
10% would like to have a daily report. Users were also asked
how often they would like their information to be scanned
(e.g., granularity for the graphs), and 50% of respondents
preferred daily granularity, 30% a monthly granularity, and
10% preferred a weekly scan.
60% of respondents would prefer to have this tool built
into the social network which was accessible at any time,
as opposed to 40% of the respondents that would like to
be notified through email, and only 10% would like to have
the service presented as a Facebook application. There were
no respondents who preferred a standalone application or a
browser plug-in.
6. PRIVACY MANAGEMENT TOOLS
In order to identify if there are tools for configuring pri-
vacy that are preferred over the currently provided tools
(RQ3), users were presented 3 different tools for customiz-
ing their privacy settings. The tools were present in both
the survey and the follow-up interview.
From the survey, 56% of the respondents said they would
like to have the 3 option system for configuring privacy. 54%
of respondents said they would like to have the short survey
mechanism. The crowdsourcing mechanism was the least
popular, with only 22% of respondents wanting to have this
mechanism available for configuring their their privacy. The
two popular options are mechanisms where there is no ad-
ditional information about what other users are sharing, or
metrics about what is more or less common to share in a
particular social network.
During the follow-up interview, users were asked to rank
each of these mechanisms, as well as the current mechanisms
on Facebook. For this purpose, a semantic scale of 1 to 5
where 1 is the least suitable and 5 is the most suitable was
used. A summary of the results is presented in Figure 5.
Most of the respondents, 80%, ranked the current pri-
vacy mechanisms below a 3. Users justified the low score
by arguing that Facebook’s current privacy mechanisms are
“difficult to understand and configure”. For the 3 option
system, most users 50% ranked it above a 3. This system
had mixed reviews. According to the respondents, one of
the major benefits is that they have a “known level of pri-
vacy” which they can then later tweak to meet their specific
requirements.
The survey based approach was rated either above a 3 by
70% of the participants. According to the respondents, this
system’s main benefit is that it doesn’t have predefined stan-
dards as the first mechanism (3 option), but instead it relies
on inferring the ideal settings given a user’s privacy require-
ments. Respondents argue that some networks have similar
systems in place where a tour of the settings is provided,
yet respondents feel they don’t want to “spend useful time”
answering these questions, or viewing the tours in order to
get a finer tuned privacy setup. However, if the survey were
short enough, they would like to define their default settings
using this mechanism.
The final mechanism that was presented to the respon-
dents consisted of using crowd sourced data to provide users
with additional information when configuring their privacy.
This was the most polarized system, and 60% of the re-
spondents rated this tool above a 3. Users gave positive
feedback to the fact that they were able to view their pri-
vacy setup compared to another group of users information
thus enabling them to mimic the settings for that particu-
lar group. However, the respondents that did not like this
system claimed that “they would not trust the privacy con-
figuration skills from other users” in the network.
It is interesting to note that, during the survey, the crowd
sourced system was the least popular option, but, once users
had the opportunity to ask questions and look at a mock-up
of the system, it had the greatest number of respondents
ranking it a 5.
7. DISCUSSION
By using crowd sourced data, our approach introduces a
new technique to end-users for understanding and configur-
ing their privacy. As a first attempt, our research shows that,
given the opportunity to ask questions and explore different
configuration options in detail during follow-up interviews,
users preferred the crowd sourced model. However, during
the survey stage of research, before the subjects were able
to ask questions, they rated the crowd sourced model lower
than the other available options.
7.1 Implications of Results
Our research shows that part of the problem with current
privacy controls is that users find them difficult to navigate.
For example, Facebook obfuscates privacy settings by hav-
ing category specific panels for certain settings instead of
a single centralized set of controls. This makes it difficult
for users to develop a comprehensive understanding of their
individual privacy settings. When we asked users to change
the website field from their Contact Settings from its cur-
rent setting to some other setting (section 4.1), most users
immediately navigated to the general privacy settings panel
which does not provide access to this field. From the 10
interviewees only half were able to successfully change the
setting in the time given. This suggests having a central-
ized location where all privacy settings could be configured
would be beneficial to users.
Some other problems with current privacy controls con-
cern persistence, validation, and comparison. Many of the
interviewees disclaimed that although they understood how
they had configured their privacy, their current settings may
not reflect that configuration because of how often Facebook
makes changes. This shows a lack of confidence in the persis-
tence of user configured settings and, as shown by Mashima
et al. [15], this doesn’t translate to user action addressing
these concerns. Furthermore, this highlights the inability of
users to validate how they believe their settings are config-
ured. Finally, current settings do not provide any context
to users allowing them to compare their own settings to the
settings of other users. By not providing context, there is
an implicit suggestion that users already know what they do
and do not want to share, and that there is some inherent
“correct” way to sharing that is obvious to users. Instead,
we argue that users can benefit by comparing to others and
our results corroborate this. Our approach addresses these
problems as follows:
• Validate: By using crowd sourced data, our technique
can provide users with an overview highlighting what
information is and is not being shared.
• Persistence: By collecting snapshots of a user’s set-
tings over time, our approach can monitor and alert
users to unanticipated changes.
Figure 5: Distribution of of ratings for privacy management tools from follow-up interview
• Comparison: The contextualized view provided with
crowd sourced data allows users to quickly identify ir-
regularities, or areas where they may find they want
to adjust their settings.
Our results suggests that many users do not know about
all of the categories exist in their profiles. When asked to
change the website field visibility from their contact settings
most users said they did not know this was a part of their
profile. We believe context is especially helpful when users
are configuring privacy for for categories they are unfamiliar
with.
As part of the follow-up interview process, we wanted to
find out not only if users preferred crowd sourced data and
found it helpful, but also how they would like to be pre-
sented with the crowd sourced tools. We provided users with
the following options: “Stand alone application,” “Browser
plug-in,”“e-mail service,”“Facebook app,” and “Other.” Al-
most all users said they would prefer that the tool be a
built in to Facebook. This suggests getting user adoption
of crowd sourced tools without the participation of social
network providers would be challenging.
7.2 Threats to Validity
There are several limitations to the validity of our study.
First, there is a selection bias because the sample of individ-
uals that answered our survey were self-selected. This im-
plies that our results are only applicable to the volunteering
population, which does not represent a complete sample of
all the social network users. Also, the sample comprises in-
dividuals from different countries and cultures, and results
may vary if the study is repeated within a specific group.
However, the sample is broad enough to allow us to identify
statistically significant trends and relationships.
Regarding internal validity, the fact that users filled out
a survey implies that only certain concerns can be iden-
tified. Also, the questions and the format in which they
are presented might constrain the limits of such concerns.
It is possible that the study overlooked certain concerns
and preferred methodologies due to the design of the sur-
vey. However, we attempted to mitigate this validity issue
by including open-ended questions where respondents could
further expand their answers, and by having “think aloud”
questions during the follow-up interview.
An inherent property of an online survey is that respon-
dents may not fully understand each of the questions and
they might also select arbitrary responses. To address these
concerns, we included validation questions and only report
statistics about respondents that correctly answered these
questions.
Despite these limitations, we managed to get a diverse
and large set of respondents. This increases our confidence
about the overall trends that reported in this paper.
8. RELATEDWORK
Extensive research has been focused on improving user
understanding of privacy and on simplifying privacy config-
uration. In the following paragraphs, we highlight important
examples of this research.
Many studies have focused on the divide between what
information users believe they are sharing and what is ac-
tually being shared and with whom. Stutzman et al. [18]
show that as Facebook users increase the ammount of in-
formation they share privately they unknowingly disclosed
information to so called “silent listeners.” Madjeski et al.
[14] find that of the 65 participants in their study, the ma-
jority either share (94%) or hide (85%) information uninten-
tionally. This is further supported in the findings of Liu et
al. [13] showing that just 37% of users’ settings coincided
with their expectations and “almost always expose content
to more users than expected.” Johnson et al. [11] conclude
that user understanding of privacy is especially at risk when
considering what information is shared with “members of
the friend network who dynamically become inappropriate
audiences based on the context of a post.” Young and Quan-
Haase [21] investigate factors that influence university stu-
dents to disclose personal information on Facebook. They
also study the different strategies students develop to protect
themselves against privacy threats. These studies all high-
light the challenges confronting users when trying to manage
their privacy settings on social networks but stop short of
making proposals for how these challenges can be addressed.
Our approach compliments the results obtained from these
studies and uses this information as a basis for proposing a
crowd sourced system that improves user understanding.
There are other researchers investigating and developing
different tools and techniques to manage privacy in online
social networks. For example, an automatic technique pro-
posed by Fang and LeFevre [5] configures a user’s privacy
settings in social networking sites by creating a machine
learning model that requires limited user input. Tootoonchian
et al. [19] propose a system called Lockr that improves the
privacy of centralized and decentralized online content shar-
ing systems. Squicciarini et al. [17] model the problem of
collaborative enforcement of privacy policies on shared data
by using game theory. By extending the notion of content
ownership, they propose a solution that offers automated
ways to share images. Another tool, developed by Toubiana
et al. [20], was designed as a geo-location aided system that
allows users to declare their photo tagging preferences at
the time a picture is taken. This system enforces users tag-
ging preferences without revealing their identity. Lipford
et al. [12] investigate mechanisms for socially appropriate
privacy management in online social networks. They study
the role of interface usability in the configuration of privacy
settings and develop a first prototype where profile infor-
mation is presented in an audience-oriented view. A tool
called PrivAware, developed by Becker and Chen [4], detects
and reports unintended information loss in online social net-
works. Additionally, this tool recommends action to take to
mitigate privacy risk. Although these studies propose alter-
native tools and mechanisms for configuring privacy, to the
best of our knowledge, there have been no tools that present
a contextualized view of privacy during user configuration.
9. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we conducted a study presenting a crowd
sourced approach for simplifying the configuration and un-
derstanding of social network privacy settings. The study
was divided into two sections: a survey for which we col-
lected 59 valid responses and a follow-up interview for which
10 survey respondents participated. While only a small por-
tion (22%) of the survey responses indicated they would
prefer a crowd sourced tool for configuring privacy, dur-
ing follow-up interviews 60% of participants said they would
prefer such a tool over the current settings after having the
opportunity to explore our approach more thoroughly.
Currently there are several obstacles that complicate user
understanding and configuration of privacy. These are ob-
fuscatory privacy control mechanisms instituted by social
networks, frequent changes to privacy policy, and default
settings intended to provide access to a users data. Our
approach addresses these problems by simplifying compre-
hension of privacy through the use of data visualizations
which provide an overview of the settings for each category
in a user’s profile.
We also provided users with data visualizations showing
an individuals privacy setup and history in a contextualized
view. For the individual visualizations, these are helpful as
a quick summary of which categories are being shared and a
quick way of determining in what ways their privacy setup
has changed over time. These would allow a user to identify
expected and unexpected changes in privacy by reviewing
how their settings change. While some participants in the
follow-up interviews did not prefer our crowd sourced ap-
proach, 70% said they found the data visualizations useful
and 80% said they would use them at least once.
Finally, our approach could be used to influence the de-
velopment of future privacy control mechanisms. Although
our mock-up and visualizations only serve as a template for
what information such a system may include, our results
show that a crowd sourced approach does improve user un-
derstanding of privacy.
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